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Abstract 
Under the provisions of the Prospectus Directive, the publication of a prospectus 
for an offer of securities to the public, or an admission of securities to trading on 
a regulated market, is subject to the prior approval of the prospectus by the 
competent authority of the issuer’s home Member State. This article examines the 
approval system as envisaged under the Directive. The aim is two-fold. First, the 
article conceptualises the approval system as a regulatory instrument. By 
studying the provisions relating to the prior approval in the Prospectus Directive, 
and by drawing on the literature on regulation, the approval system will be 
conceptualised as an ex ante enforcement system. Second, the article examines 
—————————————————— 
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the approval system critically as an investor protection measure and as a risk 
reduction strategy for issuers. Proceeding on the premise that in order to justify 
the prior approval, the approval system must not only improve upon the quality of 
disclosure but that this improvement must matter if considered from the perspec-
tive of the recipient of the approved prospectus, the benefits and costs of the prior 
approval will be assessed for investors and issuers. These two points will be 
developed hereunder by examining in turn the regulatory nature and the purpose 
of the approval system. 
 
Keywords: Prospectus Directive, prospectus approval, disclosure regulation, 
public offer, admission to trading on a regulated market, enforcement, supervi-
sion. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the cornerstones of the European Union’s regulatory strategy for the 
creation of a single securities market is the Prospectus Directive (hereinafter, 
PD).1 The Directive, which Member States had to transpose into national law by 1 
July 2005, determines the prospectus disclosure requirements for issuers of 
securities which are to be admitted to trading on a regulated market or to be 
offered to the public. The PD replaces two disclosure directives: (i) the Listing 
Particulars Directive – integrated with the Admission Directive, the Interim 
Reports Directive and the Substantial Shareholdings Directive in the Securities 
Consolidation Directive – which set out disclosure requirements in relation to an 
admission of securities to official listing and (ii) the Public Offers Directive 
which covered disclosure requirements in relation to an offer of securities to the 
public.2 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the PD – certainly in comparison to 
its predecessors – is its ‘maximum harmonisation’ approach in relation to disclosure 
requirements. A Commission Regulation thus supplements the framework disclo-
sure principles provided for under the Directive by more detailed information 
schedules which set out the disclosure items that issuers have to comply with if they 
wish to apply for admission of their securities to trading on a regulated market or if 
—————————————————— 
1 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ 2003 L 345/64. 
2 Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on 
the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing and on information to be published 
on those securities, OJ 2001 L 184/1; Council Directive 89/298/EEC of 17 April 1989 
coordinating the requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the prospectus to 
be published when transferable securities are offered to the public, OJ 1989 L 124/8. 
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they wish to offer their securities to the public.3 Maximum harmonisation in this 
context means that Member States/national authorities are deprived of the discretion 
to request that prospectuses include information items additional to those of the 
Commission Regulation. With the PD now supposed to be transposed into the 
national laws of the Member States, attention turns increasingly to the day-to-day 
enforcement of the disclosure requirements at national level. This article focuses on 
the enforcement of disclosure obligations and, in particular, on the approval of 
prospectuses by national authorities. Under the provisions of the PD, prospectuses 
are subject to prior approval by the competent authority of the issuer’s ‘home’ 
Member State (as defined in Art. 2(1)(m)) before they can be published and the 
securities can be admitted to trading on a regulated market or offered to the public. 
The aim of this article is to conceptualise the approval system as a regulatory 
instrument and to examine it critically by adopting a law and economics lens. In 
order to do so, the regulatory nature of the approval system will be examined first 
(section 2). It will be argued that under the PD the approval system is best viewed 
as an ex ante enforcement system. Next, the effectiveness of the approval system 
will be assessed by examining critically its purpose (section 3). While the costs of 
the approval system are in theory relatively straightforward to determine, it will be 
shown that the benefits of providing for prior approval by national authorities are 
far less straightforward to ascertain. Adopting a law and economics perspective, this 
article will consider the cost and benefits of the prospectus approval for professional 
and ordinary investors and for issuers. The findings will be summarised in the 
conclusion (section 4). 
 
 
2. THE REGULATORY NATURE OF THE PROSPECTUS APPROVAL SYSTEM 
 
‘Regulation’ is a term which is often stripped of any precise meaning.4 In the 
absence of any accepted definition,5 ‘regulation’ may thus be understood as 
referring either to ‘rule-making’ in a narrow sense or to market regulation in its 
widest sense. Hereunder, I refer to ‘regulation’ in its widest sense. This article 
argues that the prior approval of prospectuses by national authorities is best 
—————————————————— 
3 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 
2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in 
prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such 
prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements, OJ 2004 L 149/1 (hereinafter, Commission 
Regulation). 
4 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London, Butterworths 1997) p. 295. 
5 A. Ogus and C. Veljanovski, Readings in the Economics of Law and Regulation (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1984) p. 233; R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation – Theory, 
Strategy, and Practice (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) pp. 1-2; R. Baldwin, C. Scott 
and C. Hood, A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1998) p. 2. 
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understood as a form of entry regulation and as such as an element of market 
regulation. More specifically, it will be argued that under the PD the approval 
system is best viewed as an ex ante enforcement system. Having examined it as 
an ex ante enforcement system (2.1), the limits of the approval system, as 
envisaged under the Directive, will be discussed (2.2). 
 
2.1 The prospectus approval, an ex ante enforcement system 
 
The characteristics of an ex ante enforcement system will be identified first 
(2.1.1), after which the approval system, as envisaged under the PD, will be 
examined in the light of these findings (2.1.2). 
 
2.1.1 The characteristics of an ex ante enforcement system 
 
An ex ante enforcement system can be described as a system in which compliance 
with a set of requirements is reviewed by a regulatory authority before a product 
or an individual is allowed to enter a regulated market or a regulated sphere of 
activity.6 The compliance technique consists in denying the product or the 
individual access if the product/individual fails to satisfy the regulatory require-
ments.7 In other words, by making access to the market subject to prior approval, 
a regulatory authority seeks to enforce compliance with regulatory requirements 
ex ante. A licensing mechanism can be cited as an example of an ex ante en-
forcement system. By making provision for a product or a professional activity to 
be subject to a license, an authority ideally aims at making sure that only products 
or individuals that comply ex ante with a minimum level of quality or a level of 
competence enter the regulated market or sphere of activity. However, because 
the entry to the regulated market or activity is conditional, an ex ante enforcement 
system raises a number of cost issues which cannot be ignored. The prior ap-
proval thus gives rise to administrative costs borne by the authority in charge of 
policing compliance. Any delay before approval is granted may also give rise to 
opportunity costs for the applicant.8 Finally, the costs for applicants (or the 
society as a whole) may be compounded in cases where the regulatory authority 
lacks resources or expertise, or where it is corrupt.9 
—————————————————— 
6 See A. Bhagwat, ‘Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative 
Discretion’, 50 Hastings Law Journal (1999) p. 1275 (discussing ex ante and ex post enforce-
ment systems). 
7 Ibid., at p. 1283. 
8 A. Ogus, Regulation – Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1994) 
p. 214 (highlighting administrative and opportunity costs in the context of a licensing system). 
9 S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, ‘The Regulation of Entry’, 
1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2002) p. 1 (on the relation between entry regulation and 
corruption). 
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2.1.2 The approval system as envisaged under the Prospectus Directive 
 
Under the provisions of the PD, the prospectus approval shares the characteristics 
of an ex ante enforcement system. The prior approval by the competent authority 
is thus a sine qua non for the publication of the prospectus and hence the admis-
sion of securities to trading on a regulated market or the public offer.10 Article 
13(1) provides that ‘[n]o prospectus shall be published until it has been approved 
by the competent authority of the home Member State’,11 a requirement which 
applies equally to prospectus supplements pursuant to Article 16(1). The relation 
between the publication and the offer to the public or the admission to trading on 
a regulated market is clarified under Article 3(1) and (3). The former states that 
‘Member States shall not allow any offer of securities to be made to the public 
within their territories without prior publication of a prospectus’, while the latter 
provides that ‘Member States shall ensure that any admission of securities on a 
regulated market situated or operating within their territories is subject to the 
publication of a prospectus’. The obligation to obtain the authority’s approval is a 
positive requirement in that the failure by the competent authority to provide a 
decision regarding the approval within the time limits provided for under Article 
13 of the Directive is not deemed to constitute approval of the prospectus.12 The 
prospectus approval system also raises cost issues typical of an ex ante enforce-
ment system. Besides the administrative costs of policing compliance, the prior 
approval may thus also give rise to opportunity costs for issuers because of delays 
before approval is granted.13 
—————————————————— 
10  PD, Arts. 3(2), 4(1) and 4(2) set out a number of exceptions to the obligation to publish a 
prospectus. 
11  Two points are worth noting. First, Art. 5(3) states that a prospectus may either consist 
of a single document or be composed of separate documents (a registration document which 
includes the information regarding the issuer, a securities note which includes the information 
on the securities to be offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market and a 
summary note). Pursuant to Art. 12(2), if the registration document has been approved earlier, 
the securities and the summary notes are subject to a separate approval. Second, in the case of 
programmes (e.g., MTN programmes), Art. 5(4) allows issuers to make use of a ‘base 
prospectus’ ‘containing all relevant information concerning the issuer and the securities offered 
to the public or to be admitted to trading on a regulated market’. Art. 5(4) further provides that 
in cases where the final terms of the offer are not included in the base prospectus they ‘shall be 
provided to investors and filed with the competent authority when each public offer is made as 
soon as practicable and if possible in advance of the beginning of the offer’. Interesting to 
highlight for the present purposes is that, while the base prospectus and any prospectus 
supplements are subject to the competent authority’s approval, Rec. (21) of the Commission 
Regulation makes explicit that ‘where the final terms are not included in the base prospectus 
they do not have to be approved by the competent authority’. 
12  PD, Art. 13(2). 
13  Admittedly, Art. 13(2) and (3) now provides for time limits within which an authority 
has to inform the applicant of its decision. Yet, a priori, these limits are of limited import. Art. 
13(4) provides that if a competent authority considers that the information is incomplete or that 
 Pierre Schammo EBOR 7(2006) 506 
While the prior approval of prospectuses can be described as a means for au-
thorities to police and enforce compliance with disclosure requirements ex ante, 
the manner in which authorities determine such compliance has to be examined 
more closely. Consider Article 2(1)(q.). According to this article, approval means 
‘the positive act at the outcome of the scrutiny of the completeness of the prospec-
tus by the home Member State’s competent authority including the consistency of 
the information given and its comprehensibility’ [emphasis added]. By defining 
the approval along these lines, Article 2(1)(q.) attempts to harmonise prospectus 
review practices, the extent or the scope of which varied among Member States in 
the past.14 At the time of the negotiations of the Directive, practices thus included 
‘box-ticking’ approaches (i.e., a formal review of whether all the information 
items provided for by law or regulation are included in the prospectus) but also 
thorough and lengthy reviews of the substance of the information disclosed under 
each information item. Different review practices among Member States have 
attracted much attention over the years, notably because they were viewed as 
having a negative impact on market integration. Recital 30 of the PD states, for 
instance, that  
 
[d]ifferences regarding the efficiency, methods and timing of the checking of 
information given in a prospectus not only make it more difficult for undertak-
ings to raise capital or to obtain admission to trading on a regulated market in 
more than one Member State but also hinder the acquisition by investors estab-
lished in one Member State of securities offered by an issuer established in 
another Member State or admitted to trading in another Member State.  
 
Some of the differences between Member States testify to deep-rooted differences 
over market regulation and how to best ensure compliance at the ex ante stage. 
For instance, at the heart of the UK approach to ensuring full disclosure has long 
been a market professional, the so-called ‘sponsor’. Sponsors are regulated by the 
UK Listing Authority, which is part of the Financial Services Authority. The 
sponsor regime has long differentiated the United Kingdom from most other 
Member States. Arguably, the sponsor regime is best understood as a recognition 
—————————————————— 
additional information is required the limits ‘apply only from the date on which such informa-
tion is provided…’. Arguably, an authority can thus always disable the time limits by 
requesting additional information, although, admittedly, there is a safeguard. Under the PD, the 
whole process is subject to a ‘reasonable grounds’ condition. In other words, an authority has to 
find on ‘reasonable grounds’ that the documents are incomplete or that supplementary 
information is required. 
14  According to the Commission the review practices ranged ‘from a simple verification 
that a document has been sent to the competent authority, without reading the document, to an 
extensive verification of the clearness, the objectivity, accuracy and consistency of the 
prospectus on all items of information, including the financial statements’. Written Question E-
1874-03 by Christopher Huhne to the Commission, OJ 2004 C 65E/97. 
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of the limits of what a regulatory authority with limited resources, time and 
expertise can achieve or be expected to achieve at the ex ante stage.15 
The manner in which authorities scrutinise prospectuses prior to deciding 
upon their approval is obviously important for assessing the effectiveness of the 
approval as an ex ante enforcement instrument. This point will be addressed more 
fully in section 3. For now, I content myself with describing the review process as 
part of my effort to describe the regulatory nature of the approval system. 
Consider Article 2(1)(q.) again. If considered in isolation, the compromise 
wording of Article 2(1)(q.) is of limited importance. Admittedly a ‘box-ticking’ 
approach is now ruled out. Under Article 2(1)(q.), authorities have to examine the 
content of the disclosure before deciding upon approving a prospectus. However, 
the wording of Article 2(1)(q.) is ambiguous. Consider the meaning of the 
‘consistency’ of the information. The extent of an authority’s obligation to verify 
the consistency of the information is not specified under Article 2(1)(q.). Hence, it 
is not clear whether pursuant to Article 2(1)(q.) authorities are only required to 
verify that the prospectus is internally consistent,16 or whether authorities are 
required to check that the information given in the prospectus is consistent with 
information outside the prospectus (e.g., information provided previously by the 
issuer or supplied by third parties). A priori, similar questions can be raised in 
respect of methods of evaluation. Adopting a wide reading, one could thus talk of 
the review of the internal consistency of the information (instead of the internal 
consistency of the prospectus) and debate whether authorities have to examine 
whether the methods employed are consistent if examined over time or whether 
they are consistent with the methods employed by issuers in the same sector of 
activity. The obligation to verify the ‘comprehensibility’ of the information is 
equally vague. The perspective which a regulatory authority adopts with regard to 
investor protection (e.g., ordinary investor or professional investor perspective) 
seems to be a likely determining factor in this context. Finally, the meaning of the 
‘completeness’ of the prospectus is also ambiguous, as it can be interpreted 
differently depending on whether one adopts a literal reading or rather a principle-
based reading. For instance, there is no doubt that, as part of the authority’s 
obligation to scrutinise the completeness of the prospectus, an authority has to 
examine whether all the disclosure requirements have been complied with. But 
what is the precise extent of an authority’s obligation to scrutinise the completeness 
of the prospectus? Some omissions may be apparent on the face of the documents 
and an authority will have no difficulty in identifying such omissions. Other 
omissions, however, may only be detected after a more thorough examination. 
—————————————————— 
15  It is worth noting that as part of the recent review of the UK Listing Rules, the sponsor 
regime and the role of the sponsor have also been reassessed. 
16  Whether, for instance, the information given on p. 5 of the prospectus is consistent with 
the figures disclosed on p. 50. 
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Indeed, some omissions can simply not be detected, unless an investigation akin 
to a due diligence is undertaken. Article 2(1)(q.) leaves these questions unre-
solved. This is not to say that these questions should have been addressed in the 
PD. Indeed, the PD is a framework directive. For now, the relevant point is 
simply to note that, if viewed in isolation, Article 2(1)(q.) levels the playing field 
only to a modest extent. 
Admittedly, the actions of the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(hereinafter, CESR) and the European Commission are important to highlight in 
this context. The recent level 2 and 3 measures thus matter because they detail the 
information requirements and provide additional recommendations to issuers and 
authorities.17 Yet, the level 3 measures are only recommendations and Member 
States apply them on a voluntary basis.18 Moreover, authorities are not exempted 
from taking a stand on the information provided when deciding whether or not the 
prospectus is complete and the information is consistent and comprehensible. In 
the future, the exact content or extent of an authority’s obligation to scrutinise the 
content of the prospectus may be further specified. Article 2(4) of the PD pro-
vides that the Commission may take implementing measures in relation to the 
definitions set out in Article 2(1). CESR’s level 3 actions may also prove impor-
tant in the future. In relation to the enforcement of standards on financial 
information for instance, CESR has taken initiatives.19 Yet, it is also important to 
recognise that discretion at national level is entirely desirable. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach is indeed difficult to justify in the light of differences between markets, 
investors, products and issuers. 
 
2.2 The limits of the prospectus approval system 
 
So far, it has been argued that the approval system is a regulatory instrument and 
that under the PD it is envisaged as an ex ante enforcement system. The compli-
ance with the disclosure requirements is determined by scrutinising the content of 
the prospectus and more specifically the completeness of the prospectus, includ-
ing the consistency and comprehensibility of the information. In this section, the 
limits of the approval system will be examined more closely. At the risk of stating 
—————————————————— 
17  Commission Regulation, op. cit. n. 3; Committee of European Securities Regulators, 
‘CESR’s recommendations for the consistent implementation of the European Commission’s 
Regulation on Prospectuses n° 809/2004’ (Ref. CESR/05-054b, February 2005), available at: 
<http://www.cesr-eu.org> (hereinafter, CESR’s Recommendations). 
18  CESR’s Recommendations, op. cit. n. 17, at p. 5. 
19  Committee of European Securities Regulators, ‘Standard No. 1 on Financial Information 
– Enforcement of Standards on Financial Information in Europe’ (CESR/03-073, March 2003), 
available at: <http://www.cesr-eu.org> (hereinafter, Standard No. 1); Committee of European 
Securities Regulators, ‘Standard No. 2 on Financial Information – Coordination of Enforcement 
Activities’ (CESR/03-317c, April 2004), available at: <http://www.cesr-eu.org> (hereinafter, 
Standard No. 2). 
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the obvious, the prior approval by the issuer’s home authority is at the heart of the 
approval system. By examining the definition of approval in Article 2(1)(q.), the 
limits of the approval system, as envisaged under the Directive, will be traced. 
First, under the PD the prior approval by authorities is not envisaged as a 
means for ascertaining the truthfulness of the information to be disclosed to the 
market. Article 2(1)(q.) defines the approval as the positive act at the outcome of a 
review of the completeness of the prospectus, including the consistency and 
comprehensibility of the information. It follows that prior to deciding upon the 
approval, authorities are not required to examine whether the information 
disclosed in the prospectus is indeed true. It is easy to see why making provision 
for an authority to examine the truthfulness of the information would raise 
considerable difficulties in practice. While authorities may require additional 
explanations or documents when reviewing a prospectus,20 at the ex ante en-
forcement stage, authorities arguably face a dilemma between trying to prevent 
wrongdoing by a low-quality issuer and ensuring that transactions by high-quality 
issuers are not hampered by excessive delays. What is problematic at the ex ante 
stage is, however, to detect potential inaccuracies (including potential omissions) 
within a limited period of time and on the basis of the documents that an authority 
is provided with (save, of course, for apparent inaccuracies which an authority 
may detect on the face of the documents). Ex post, once the harm is done, or bad 
news which was not expected by the market emerges, the issuer is singled out and 
authorities are in a position to use their investigative powers to ascertain inaccu-
racies or material omissions in the documentation submitted earlier. However, at 
the ex ante stage, detecting potential inaccuracies among all the documents which 
an authority is required to review is likely to require considerable skill, resources, 
efforts and time and may indeed prove impossible or at least difficult without 
performing exceptional investigations which may hamper market operations. Of 
course, if an authority has a suspicion (e.g., because of rumours circulating in the 
market), a low-quality issuer can be singled out at the approval stage. Neverthe-
less, considering the practical difficulties of detecting inaccuracies at the ex ante 
stage and the costs likely to be caused by excessive delays, it is not desirable to 
make the approval conditional upon a review of the truthfulness of the informa-
tion by an authority.21 
—————————————————— 
20  Art. 21(3) provides for a minimum list of powers which national authorities have to be 
equipped with. These powers are of course critical in order to make sure that authorities can 
fulfil their review tasks. 
21  It is worth noting that there may be some overlap here. For instance, if the information in 
the prospectus is not true and sincere it may also be inconsistent with other sources of 
information to which an authority may have access. Hence, it is important to determine the 
precise extent of an authority’s obligation to verify the consistency of the information and the 
completeness of the prospectus, which are quality characteristics an authority has to review and 
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Second, under the PD the prior approval by authorities is not envisaged as a 
means for assessing the economic or financial opportuneness (or desirability) of a 
securities transaction for investors.22 To assess the opportuneness of a securities 
transaction, an authority has first to examine and decide upon the quality of the 
proposed transaction, including the financial or economic situation of the issuer. 
The scrutiny of the quality of the proposed transaction is, however, different in 
nature to the examination an authority has to perform prior to approving a 
prospectus. The approval is thus the act which follows an examination of the 
quality of the disclosure – or to be more specific, an examination of different 
disclosure quality characteristics which are the completeness of the prospectus, 
including the consistency and comprehensibility of the information – whereas to 
determine the opportuneness of a transaction, an authority has not only to 
examine the quality of the disclosure but also the quality of the proposed transac-
tion. As for the question of the accuracy of the information, requiring an authority 
to decide upon the quality of a securities transaction (e.g., with a view to the 
opportuneness of the transaction for investors) would raise difficult questions. 
Besides the question of the authority’s expertise, incentives and resources to 
complete such an assessment, the question of whether a paternalistic approach to 
securities regulation is justified would have to be examined more closely, in 
particular, if the authority’s judgment as to the quality of the transaction were to 
pre-empt investors from forming their own judgment.23 
Third, the approval, as envisaged under the PD, is not conditional upon an 
authority satisfying a particular standard of diligence, as may be the case for 
market professionals such as gatekeepers under applicable national law. The PD 
thus makes no provision for an authority to satisfy a particular standard of ‘due 
care’ or, for instance, a ‘reasonableness standard’ (e.g., to take all steps which it 
can reasonably be expected to take) when examining that the prospectus is 
complete and the information consistent and comprehensible. The question of the 
diligence an authority has to exercise is likely to be determined under national 
provisions governing the liability of authorities. In this context, it is worth noting 
that Article 13(6) of the PD states that ‘[t]his Directive shall not affect the 
competent authority’s liability, which shall continue to be governed solely by 
national law’. 
—————————————————— 
the failure of which may result in an authority being held liable depending on the applicable 
national law. 
22  In the literature, this form of assessment is also referred to as ‘merit regulation’. See, for 
instance, G. Hertig, R. Kraakman and E. Rock, ‘Issuers and Investor Protection’, in R. 
Kraakman, P. Davies, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda and E. Rock, eds., The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law – A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford, Oxford 
University 2004) p. 193 at pp. 207-208. 
23  The question of paternalism as a motivation for regulation is examined in Ogus, op. cit. 
n. 8, at pp. 51-53. 
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Having examined the prior approval as an ex ante enforcement instrument, the 
next question, which is the question of the purpose of a prior approval system, has 
already been touched upon. However, considering the cost aspects of the approval 
system in particular, a critical examination is warranted. 
 
 
3. THE PURPOSE OF THE PROSPECTUS APPROVAL SYSTEM: A CRITICAL 
EXAMINATION 
 
In this section, the approval system is critically examined as a regulatory instru-
ment through a law and economic lens. The argument proceeds as follows. First, 
the relation between mandatory disclosure, the approval system and the quality of 
disclosure will be examined (3.1). Next, the benefits and costs of the approval 
system will be assessed for the various recipients of the approved prospectus 
(3.2). The argument proceeds on the premise that in order to justify the prior 
approval by authorities, the approval system must contribute to improving upon 
the quality of disclosure and that this must matter if considered from the perspec-
tive of the recipients of the approved prospectus. 
 
3.1 Mandatory disclosure, the prospectus approval system and the 
quality of disclosure 
 
Rather than highlighting a possible lack of expertise, financial resources or 
missing financial incentives for national authorities to act effectively and effi-
ciently (all of which, it is acknowledged, are important issues), the approval 
system will be taken seriously and considered as an element in the disclosure 
quality enforcement chain (3.1.2). First, however, it is necessary to take a step 
back and situate the question of the quality of disclosure in the broader context of 
a mandatory disclosure regime (3.1.1). 
 
3.1.1 The disclosure quality question in the context of a mandatory disclosure 
regime 
 
Disclosure regulation mandates issuers to provide information. This may take 
different forms. A provision may set out a disclosure principle requiring an issuer to 
provide all necessary information for investors to make an informed assessment of 
the transaction being offered. In addition, a series of detailed provisions may require 
an issuer to disclose information on a multitude of specific information items.24 
—————————————————— 
24  Hertig, Kraakman and Rock, loc. cit. n. 22, at pp. 199-201 (dividing information re-
quirements into (i) ‘hard “benchmark” data’, (ii) ‘“soft”, “projective,” or “forward-looking” 
information’ and (iii) information relating to ‘governance issues and agency problems’). 
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Under the PD, a rule-based disclosure principle is provided for under Article 5(1), 
while specific information requirements are implemented via a Commission 
Regulation.25 Typical examples of information items relate to the issuer’s activities, 
its properties, plants and machinery, its risk factors, the remuneration of its direc-
tors, its assets or liabilities, its profit and losses, its investments, its research and 
development, trend information, and so forth. 
Disclosure has costs and benefits for issuers. In the US literature, the cost-
benefit relation has been at the heart of the debate on the merit of mandatory 
disclosure regulation. The different stages of this debate are now well known.26 
The mandatory nature of the US disclosure rules was thus first criticised in the 
1960s by authors such as Stigler and Benston. In the 1980s, the discussion moved 
towards a qualified endorsement following contributions to the debate by authors 
such as Easterbrook/Fischel and Coffee. Recently, the debate on the merit of 
mandatory disclosure has been picked up by proponents and opponents of 
regulatory competition such as Romano and Fox in order to underpin their claims 
in favour of or against issuer’s choice.27 Mandatory disclosure also continues to 
be a fertile ground for academic research as new findings in the social sciences 
provide new conceptual approaches to its study.28 While the debate does not yet 
seem to be settled, the general view, which is emerging after decades of contro-
versy, is nevertheless that mandatory disclosure is warranted as, absent mandatory 
requirements, issuers are likely to disclose too little information.29 Yet, if one 
accepts the view that issuers have incentives to disclose too little, one has to ask 
about the extent of the constraint which a mandatory disclosure regime can place 
on such conduct. For instance, if one sharpens the analytical lens and looks at 
specific information items, it is possible to make a rough distinction between 
—————————————————— 
25  Commission Regulation, op. cit. n. 3. 
26  E.g., G. Stigler, ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Markets’, 37 J. Bus. Law (1964) p. 
117; G. Benston, ‘The Value of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements’, 44 Acct. Rev. 
(1969) p. 515; G. Benston, ‘Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934’, 63 American Economic Review (1973) p. 132; J. Seligman, 
‘The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System’, 9 The Journal of 
Corporation Law (1983) p. 1; J. Coffee, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System’, 70 Virginia Law Review (1984) p. 717; F. Easterbrook and D. 
Fischel, ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’, 70 Virginia Law Review 
(1984) p. 669; R. Daines and C. Jones ‘Mandatory Disclosure, Asymmetric Information and 
Liquidity: The Impact of the 1934 Act’ (March 2003), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=686888>. 
27  E.g., R. Romano, ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’ 
107 Yale Law Journal (1998) p. 2359; M. Fox, ‘Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: 
Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment’, 85 Virginia Law Review 1 (1999) p. 1335. 
28  E.g., S. Bainbridge, ‘A Behavioral Economic Analysis of Mandatory Disclosure: A 
Thought Experiment Turned Cautionary Tale’ (January 2000), available at: <http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=204110>. 
29  Hertig, Kraakman and Rock, loc. cit. n. 22, at p. 204. 
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information items which essentially require issuers to provide standardised 
information (leaving issuers little discretion) and items which require issuers to 
provide a description of a particular business or situation (e.g., research and 
development, risk factors, related party transactions, trend information). As far as 
the latter type of items is concerned, the precise extent of the disclosure to be 
provided may not necessarily be straightforward to determine.30 Moreover, issuers 
may not only ‘gloss over’31 material facts: they may ‘lie outright’.32 Accordingly, 
even under a mandatory disclosure regime, the quality of disclosure may still vary 
significantly.  
To address the quality concern a number of strategies can be envisaged. One 
strategy is to make sure that issuers are subject to liability provisions and that the 
costs of litigation for investors are low.33 In the United States, for instance, 
litigation (.private enforcement) is facilitated by the shareholder class action. 
Misrepresentations, misleading financial reports or insider trading are types of 
wrongdoings which commonly result in class actions.34 As a result, the extent of 
the disclosure is strongly influenced by the threat of litigation. Extensive disclo-
sure on items such as ‘risk factors’ provide evidence to this effect. In Europe, 
however, the litigation threat is not as important.35 The absence of procedural 
mechanisms such as the shareholder class action arguably further contributes to 
this.36 The PD addresses the question of civil liability marginally. Under Article 
—————————————————— 
30  Admittedly, the more detailed the information items, the less discretion is left to issuers. 
31  L. Loss and J. Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (New York, Aspen 
2004) p. 129. 
32  Hertig, Kraakman and Rock, loc. cit. n. 22, at p. 204. 
33  See B. Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’, 
48 UCLA Law Review (2001) p. 781 at pp. 796-797. On the importance of investor protection 
for the development of securities markets, see also the empirical work by R. La Porta, F. 
Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’, 52 
Journal of Finance (1997) p. 1131. See also R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 
‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, 61 Journal of Finance (2006) p. 1. The work of La Porta, et 
al., has notably been criticised for assuming too easily that strong investor protection laws 
cause strong securities markets to develop. See J. Coffee, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: 
The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control’, 111 Yale Law 
Journal (2001) p. 1; E. Ferran, Building an EU Securities Markets (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2004) pp. 27-28. 
34  J. Cox and R. Thomas, ‘SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry’, 53 Duke 
Law Journal (2003) p. 737 at p. 749. 
35  E.g., J. Coffee, ‘Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms’, 84 Boston University Law Review (2004) p. 301 at p. 343. 
36  The importance of private enforcement was recently discussed by G. Ferrarini and P. 
Guidici when examining the Parmalat scandal. In particular, the authors pointed to deficiencies 
in civil procedure law and stressed the need for reforms in civil procedure systems. G. Ferrarini 
and P. Guidici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, 
ECGI Law Working Paper No. 40/2005 (May 2005), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=730403>. 
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6(1) Member States must make sure that responsibility for the information 
provided ‘attaches at least to the issuer, or its administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies, the offeror, the person asking for admission to trading on a 
regulated market or the guarantor, as the case may be’, while Article 6(2) 
provides that Member States shall make sure that their national provisions on civil 
liability apply to those that are responsible for this information.37 To address 
disclosure quality concerns, a number of complementary strategies can a priori be 
envisaged. The literature on (.product) licensing and certification provides a 
helpful starting point for examining these strategies. 
The quality question is at the heart of the literature on product licensing and 
certification.38 Both mechanisms aim at making unobservable information about 
the quality of a product ascertainable and as such help to reduce the prospect of 
seeing a ‘lemons market’ develop.39 Securities markets certainly raise the type of 
‘lemons market’ issues which are usually put forward as a justification for 
certification or licensing.40 To appreciate the quality of disclosure is indeed by no 
means straightforward. Even sophisticated investors will have difficulties 
differentiating low-quality disclosure from high-quality disclosure and as such 
determining the quality of the securities at offer.41 To alleviate this problem one 
strategy is to rely on certification by third parties. So-called gatekeepers may thus 
verify the quality of the information to be disclosed or assess the quality of the 
securities to be offered. The auditor is the typical example of a professional 
gatekeeper. Rating agencies (on the debt side) but also investment bankers or 
potentially lawyers may also serve as gatekeepers. In the literature, the role of 
gatekeepers has been extensively examined and debated.42 As Coffee notes:  
—————————————————— 
37  In relation to the prospectus summary the same article provides that ‘… Member States 
shall ensure that no civil liability shall attach to any persons solely on the basis of the summary, 
including any translation thereof, unless it is misleading, inaccurate or inconsistent when read 
together with the other parts of the prospectus’. 
38  See Ogus, op. cit. n. 8, at p. 214; J. Beales III, ‘Licensing and Certification Systems’, in 
P. Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Volume 2 (New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan 2002) p. 578. 
39  G. Akerlof, ‘The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism’, 
84 Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970) p. 488. 
40  See Black, loc. cit. n. 33, at p. 786. 
41  Easterbrook and Fischel, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 674; H. Scott, ‘Internationalization of Pri-
mary Public Securities Markets’, 63 Law and Contemporary Problems (2000) p. 71 at p. 75 
(‘… there is generally no way for an investor, sophisticated or otherwise, to know that he is 
missing information and to attach an appropriate discount to that risk’). See also Black, loc. cit. 
n. 33, at p. 786. 
42  E.g., R. Kraakman, ‘Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy’, 
2 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization (1986) p. 53; S. Choi, ‘Market Lessons for 
Gatekeepers’, 92 Northwestern University Law Review (1998) p. 916; F. Partnoy, ‘Barbarians 
at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime’, 79 Washington 
University Law Quarterly (2001) p. 491; Coffee, loc. cit. n. 35. 
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… the professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or vouches for the corporate 
client’s own statements about itself or a specific transaction. This duplication 
is desired because the market recognizes that the gatekeeper has a lesser incen-
tive to deceive than does its client and thus regards the gatekeeper’s assurance 
or evaluation as more credible.43 
 
Licensing is, besides certification, another strategy relied upon in product 
markets. Like certification, licensing can a priori be justified because of asym-
metric information between a seller and a buyer. Unlike a certification system, 
however, a product licensing system denies products entrance to the regulated 
market if they fail to satisfy the set requirements. I already noted that the approval 
system, as an ex ante enforcement system, shares this characteristic.44 Under the 
PD, the approval is thus a sine qua non for the publication of the prospectus and 
hence for the securities to be admitted to trading on a regulated market or to be 
offered to the public. Moreover, the importance of a strong regulator capable of 
responding to information asymmetry problems is highlighted in the literature. 
Black, for instance, views an honest regulator with sufficient experience and 
resources as crucial to countering information asymmetries and as such as a ‘core 
institution’ (along with other institutions such as a good judicial system) for 
strong securities markets.45 The remaining part of this article will examine the 
approval system as an enforcement strategy. First, however, the relation between 
the quality of disclosure and the approval process has to be clarified. 
 
3.1.2 The approval system as envisaged under the Prospectus Directive, 
an element in the ‘quality enforcement chain’? 
 
So far, the justifications for a mandatory disclosure system have been examined. 
The question of the quality of disclosure was raised as well as the question of the 
precise relation between the approval system and the quality of disclosure. In 
order to clarify this relation and to proceed with the argument, I propose to sum 
—————————————————— 
43  Coffee, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 309. 
44  The ‘product’ in this context is the prospectus and the subject of enquiry is the disclosure 
provided therein. 
45  Black, loc. cit. n. 33, at pp. 789-790. On the relative importance of the regulator and 
courts in enforcing the law, see E. Glaeser, S. Johnson and A. Shleifer, ‘Coase vs. Coasians’, 
116 Quarterly Journal of Economics (2001) p. 853; C. Xu and K. Pistor, Law Enforcement 
under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation, Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 222 (April 2003), available at: <http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=396141> (distinguishing between ‘proactive’ law enforce-
ment by a regulator and ‘reactive’ enforcement by courts). On the empirical side, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, loc. cit. n. 33, at p. 27 provide a more ambiguous picture as to 
the importance of public enforcement: ‘… securities laws matter because they facilitate private 
contracting rather than provide for public regulatory enforcement’). 
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up some of the analytical points made earlier when discussing the regulatory 
nature of the approval system. 
The quality of disclosure can be viewed as a function of a number of different, 
more or less important and, admittedly, to some extent overlapping disclosure 
quality characteristics. Arguably, one of the most important determining factors 
of the quality of the disclosure is its accuracy. The accuracy of the disclosure 
depends on the information being correct/true. If investors, for instance, anticipate 
that issuers have incentives to lie and hence have doubts as to the truthfulness of 
the information, a lemons market may develop. Besides the accuracy of the 
information, the quality of the disclosure is further a function of the completeness 
of the information. In order to value the issuer and to assess the quality of the 
securities, it is crucial that the prospectus does not omit any material information. 
The comprehensibility or indeed the presentation of the information may also be 
important, as comprehensible and orderly presented information makes the 
disclosure easier to analyse and to compare with information disclosed across a 
sector. When discussing the limits of the approval system earlier, it was noted that 
under the approval system the compliance with disclosure obligations was 
determined by scrutinising specific disclosure quality characteristics. In this 
context, Article 2(1)(q.), which refers to the review of the completeness of the 
prospectus and the consistency and comprehensibility of the information, was 
highlighted. It was also noted that it follows from the wording of Article 2(1)(q.) 
that under the Directive an authority is not held to ascertain whether the informa-
tion given in the prospectus is true.46 Yet, it was also noted that the wording of 
Article 2(1)(q.) is ambiguous as regards the exact scope of the prospectus review. 
The review of the completeness of the prospectus, which was identified as an 
important disclosure quality characteristic, or the consistency of the information 
may thus, depending on the interpretation given, require a more or less extensive 
examination by authorities and as such contribute more or less importantly to 
establishing the level of quality of the information disclosed. While a level of 
discretion at national level is entirely desirable, to pursue my line of enquiry 
further, the argument here is simplified by assuming that a narrower view of an 
authority’s own role in establishing quality characteristics such as the complete-
ness of the prospectus or the consistency of the information is adopted. In fact, 
this assumption is reasonable because of the difficulty of assessing disclosure 
characteristics such as the completeness of the information without an examina-
tion which is akin to a due diligence. Hence, the next question is to what extent 
—————————————————— 
46  Admittedly, the investigations by gatekeepers may contribute to establishing quality 
characteristics such as the accuracy of the information, and national authorities may rely on 
these enquiries before they decide upon the approval. Yet, establishing the importance of 
gatekeepers for ensuring the quality of disclosure does not provide support for the establish-
ment of a prior approval system. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the gatekeeper 
system may suffer from serious defects. 
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the review by the competent authority of such disclosure quality characteristics 
matters if considered from the perspective of the recipients of the approved 
prospectus. 
 
3.2 The prospectus approval system from the perspective of the 
recipients of the approved prospectus 
 
Recipients are obviously investors, who possess different degrees of expertise, 
means or resources to ascertain the quality of the disclosure (3.2.1), but also the 
issuer itself whose prospectus must be approved before publication and hence 
before that the admission to trading or the offer to the public can take place (3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1  The prospectus approval system from the perspective of the investor 
 
It was noted above that the premise underlying this article is that, in order to 
justify the prior approval by authorities, the approval system must contribute to 
improving upon the quality of disclosure and that this must matter if considered 
from the perspective of the recipients of the approved prospectus. The improve-
ment matters for investors if it reduces verification costs or facilitates the 
processing of the information,47 or simply if the prior review and approval 
strengthens investor confidence, a concern underlying the PD but also CESR’s 
recent actions on the enforcement of standards on financial information, for 
instance.48 Moreover, the benefits of the approval system for investors have to be 
assessed in light of those information quality characteristics which a national 
authority is held to review before approving the prospectus (that is, the complete-
ness of the prospectus and the consistency and comprehensibility of the 
information). This is because investors can be only confident that these quality 
characteristics are indeed reviewed prior to approving the prospectus. Arguably, if 
the approval system was based on a selective approach under which some issuers 
are singled out at the approval stage and made subject to an exceptional examina-
tion by authorities, the mere threat of being singled out could incentivise issuers 
to fully disclose all information. In theory, the ex ante enforcement by the 
authority could thus hold benefits for investors, even though authorities would in 
most cases only perform a lighter examination. Such a ‘selective review’ is 
carried out by the SEC. Under this procedure some registrants are not reviewed 
—————————————————— 
47  The relation between verification and processing costs (as types of information costs) 
and market efficiency is discussed in R. Gilson and R. Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency’, 70 Virginia Law Review (1984) p. 549 at pp. 592-614. The same authors provide a 
sobering assessment of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in R. Gilson and R. Kraakman, ‘The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias’, 28 Journal of 
Corporation Law (2003) p. 715. 
48  PD, Rec. 18; Standard No. 1, op. cit. n. 19, at p. 3. 
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while some others are singled out according to selection criteria which the SEC 
chooses not to disclose.49 This is unlike the approval system as envisaged under 
the PD. Moreover, the strength of the selective review approach crucially depends 
on its deterrence effect on issuers. In turn, the deterrence effect depends on the 
sophistication of the selection procedure and factors such as the expertise, 
resources, skills but also the vigour with which an authority pursues its mission. 
All of these factors are difficult to assess with any certainty. Hereunder, I 
continue examining the provision which specifies the information quality 
characteristics an authority has to review prior to deciding upon the prospectus 
approval. Investors can thus be confident only that prior to approving a prospec-
tus an authority has scrutinised the completeness of the prospectus, the 
consistency of the information and its comprehensibility. Having specified the 
terms of this enquiry, the approval system is considered next from the perspective 
of the professional investor and from the perspective of the ordinary investor. 
Starting with professional investors, the first point to note is that they have 
expertise, resources and means to appreciate and process information.50 This 
means that while an authority may, for instance, contribute to improving the 
quality of disclosure by reviewing the comprehensibility of the information, such 
a review has little added value for professional investors who themselves are in a 
position to appreciate this quality characteristic. Admittedly, the capacity and 
willingness of professional investors to assess disclosure quality characteristics 
may be limited if more intense investigations are required.51 Professional inves-
tors may thus be unwilling or unable to establish whether the prospectus is 
without material omissions or inaccuracies which are not apparent on the face of 
the document. However, the crucial point is that professional investors can neither 
be confident that, because the prospectus has been approved, there are no such 
omissions or inaccuracies in the document. To attempt to remedy shortcomings 
and gain some comfort as to the quality of disclosure, investors may instead 
decide to rely on market professionals such as gatekeepers who examine the 
quality of the information or value the quality of the securities.52 
—————————————————— 
49  Loss and Seligman, op. cit. n. 31, at p.128. 
50  Cf., Romano, loc. cit. n. 27, at p. 2378 (noting that ‘[t]he institutional investors who 
dominate today’s markets have far greater ability, as well as financial incentives, to process 
information and price securities than does the SEC staff.’). 
51  Easterbrook and Fischel, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 675 (noting that ‘[i]nvestors do not even 
want to inspect; they seek to be passive recipients of an income stream, not to be private 
investigators’); Scott, loc. cit. n. 41, at p. 75 (noting that ‘… there is generally no way for an 
investor, sophisticated or otherwise, to know that he is missing information and to attach an 
appropriate discount to that risk’). 
52  Admittedly, corporate scandals such as Enron have revealed the limits of the gatekeeper 
system. Yet, highlighting the failures of such a system in the present context misses the crucial 
point which is that the approval system does not contribute to making the gatekeeper more 
effective. 
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Arguably, the approval system may still hold benefits for professional inves-
tors in terms of information standardisation. When reviewing documents an 
authority could thus request issuers, applying for approval, to further detail the 
disclosure provided. By requesting all issuers to provide the same information 
complements, an authority could, in theory, work towards a greater standardisa-
tion of the content of prospectuses across sectors of activities. This, in turn, could 
improve the comparability and comprehensibility of the disclosure provided by 
issuers and among issuers of the same sector of activity.53 Yet, this argument is 
problematic. First, following the adoption of the PD, the level 2 Commission 
Regulation and CESR’s level 3 recommendations now specify information 
requirements in greater detail and as such contribute to a greater level of stan-
dardisation. More fundamentally, the need for greater information standardisation 
hardly justifies the setting up of a prior approval system. This is because, at the 
approval stage, an authority exercises individual decision-making (enforcement) 
power. Standardisation efforts are, however, best addressed by exercising general 
decision-making power (e.g., by regulation or issuing recommendations). Aside 
from this, one may also question whether it would be legitimate for national 
authorities to standardise information in such a manner following the adoption of 
the PD. This is because the PD adopts a maximum harmonisation approach in 
relation to disclosure requirements. Member States are generally not allowed to 
lay down additional disclosure requirements, although the PD provides that an 
authority may require issuers, applying for approval, to include supplementary 
information in the prospectus.54 Articles 3 and 22(1) of the Commission Regula-
tion attempt to clarify this by providing that, while a competent authority cannot 
request additional information items to be included, it may nevertheless, when 
approving a prospectus, require that the information provided is completed ‘for 
each of the information items, on a case by case basis’. The Commission Regula-
tion thus draws a fine line on the basis of the information items set out in the 
annexes to the Commission Regulation. Yet, even if an authority’s standardisation 
efforts would not result in new items being included, the question whether an 
authority was truly acting on a ‘case by case basis’ when requesting information 
complements with a view to standardising information among issuers in such a 
manner would have to be raised. Standardisation efforts of this kind would 
certainly be hard to justify if considered in the light of the underlying objective of 
levelling the playing field among Member States. 
Hence, the prior approval by national authorities is unlikely to be of much 
benefit to professional investors. It follows that, if considered on a cost-benefit 
—————————————————— 
53  Hertig, Kraakman and Rock, loc. cit. n. 22, at p. 206 (noting that ‘[s]tandardization 
improves comprehensibility and comparability, thus increasing the value of information to 
investors’). 
54  PD, Art. 21(3)(a). 
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basis, the costs of the prior approval are likely to weigh quite strongly in the 
balance. The next question to examine is whether ordinary investors (i.e., retail 
investors) may benefit from the authority’s prior approval. While intermediated 
investment is still the major type of retail investor activity in the European 
Community, the PD certainly provides evidence as to the existence of an EC 
agenda which seeks to stimulate retail investment activities.55 Ordinary investors 
can be assumed to lack the expertise, resources and means which were associated 
earlier with professional investors. Moreover, their investment behaviour is likely 
to be less sophisticated. Possibly, it is also more likely to be affected by cognitive 
biases. Accordingly, examining the approval system from the perspective of 
ordinary investors, rather than from the perspective of professional investors, is 
perhaps a better starting point. A priori, the obligation placed on authorities to 
review the comprehensibility of the information can be justified if examined from 
the perspective of retail investors. If retail investors have difficulties comprehend-
ing ‘legalese’ writing and as such fail to appreciate the risks involved with a 
transaction, even the fullest and most accurate disclosure is unlikely to serve 
investors. The SEC, for instance, has addressed this concern in the form of its 
‘Plain English’ initiative.56 Moreover, unlike professional investors, ordinary 
investors are unlikely to possess the expertise and skills necessary to appreciate 
for instance whether the prospectus is, even on its face, complete. Hence, the 
obligation placed on authorities to review the completeness of the prospectus may 
a priori also prove to be important for the protection of retail investors. Yet, the 
merit of these arguments depends critically on the appropriateness of disclosure 
regulation as a regulatory strategy for the protection of ordinary investors. 
Ordinary investors can thus only benefit from an authority’s efforts to improve 
upon the quality of disclosure if they are able to appreciate themselves, on the 
basis of such disclosure, the quality of the securities transaction at offer. At the 
outset, this presupposes that investors fully read the prospectus.57 In fact, it is 
possible that the prior approval may have perverse effects if ordinary investors 
fail to appreciate the precise scope of an authority’s ex ante review. The prior 
approval by national authorities may, for instance, create overconfident investors. 
For many years, the French regulatory authority – that is, the Commission des 
opérations de bourse (Cob) which has now been replaced by the Autorité des 
marchés financiers (AMF) – has thus added a specific statement onto approved 
—————————————————— 
55  See also N. Moloney, ‘New Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law: From Market Con-
struction to Market Regulation’, 40 Common Market Law Review (2003) p. 809 at pp. 822-833 
(referring to a ‘paradigm shift’ in relation to investor protection at EC level). 
56  E.g., A. Serafin, ‘Kicking the Legalese Habit: The SEC’s “Plain English Disclosure” 
Proposal’, 29 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal (1998) p. 681. 
57  Scott, loc. cit. n. 41, at p. 73 (noting that most individual investors are not reading pro-
spectuses). 
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prospectuses with the aim of attracting the attention of investors to the limited 
scope of the prospectus review. 
Admittedly, the PD now requires a summary to be included in the prospectus 
(save in the case of non-equity securities of at least €50,000 where Member States 
are left with an option).58 However, the inclusion of the summary does clearly not 
exempt investors from reading the prospectus. Article 5(2) makes it clear. 
Moreover, even if retail investors do read prospectuses, disclosure as a regulatory 
strategy in the context of securities regulation will always require a certain 
technical understanding and hence a level of sophistication on the part of the 
investor. It follows that efforts to protect ordinary investors, by seeking to 
improve upon the quality of the disclosure, may prove to be ineffective absent 
separate actions aimed at educating investors. Yet, despite the difficulties which 
the above analysis reveals, national authorities, in their daily practice, continue to 
view the approval system as an important instrument for the protection of 
ordinary investors.59 
 
3.2.2 The prospectus approval system from the perspective of the issuer 
 
Examining the benefits of the prior approval from the perspective of issuers may 
at first seem surprising, considering that it is generally understood as an investor 
protection measure. The approval system certainly bears costs for issuers. I think, 
in particular, of the cost of delays caused by the approval process. Yet, it can be 
argued that if the approval system is not unduly inefficient (for instance, by 
creating excessive delays), it may hold benefits for issuers. Central to this 
argument is that legal risk is a concern for issuers and that issuers will seek to 
limit such risk. Legal risk refers to the risk of being found in breach of regulatory 
requirements. Easterbrook and Fischel for instance note that ‘[f]irms that disclose 
what they think appropriate for investors may be surprised to learn, a few years 
later, that they did not disclose enough things or the right things. This is needless 
risk, and greater risk increases the firm’s cost of capital.’60 In theory, issuers 
should be interested in determining the extent of such risk before that the securi-
ties are admitted to trading or offered to the public. The question which has to be 
—————————————————— 
58  PD, Art. 5(2). 
59  It is worth noting that in the literature it is argued that ordinary investors may be pro-
tected by professional trading in the market. Yet, this point should not be overrated. Hertig, 
Kraakman and Rock, loc. cit. n. 22, at p. 206, for instance, note that ‘… the empirical literature 
suggests that liquid share markets mitigate this problem of unsophisticated investors, since 
professional trading efficiently reflects public information into share prices, and so (inadver-
tently) protects poorly informed traders. Yet there is no such protection when markets are thin 
and illiquid because, for example, they lack a clientele of professional traders dealing in the 
shares of small and mid-sized issuers’ [footnotes omitted]). 
60  Easterbrook and Fischel, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 699. 
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examined now is whether the approval system, as provided for under the PD, can 
be envisaged as such an ex ante risk reduction strategy.61 As for investors, this 
line of enquiry takes as a starting point the definition of prospectus approval in 
Article 2(1)(q.). Issuers can thus only be confident that, prior to deciding upon the 
approval, the authority will scrutinise the completeness of the prospectus, the 
consistency of the information and its comprehensibility. As for investors, it is 
assumed that the obligation placed on an authority to scrutinise the content of the 
prospectus along these lines is interpreted narrowly. 
Although the prior approval of the prospectus does not protect the issuer from 
subsequent actions by the authority or from subsequent court proceedings, it can 
be argued that issuers benefit from the fact that an authority checks, as part of its 
obligation to examine the completeness of the prospectus, the technical compli-
ance with the disclosure requirements set out in the PD and the Commission 
Regulation. In theory, the approval should thus provide the issuer with the 
certainty that the regulatory authority is satisfied with the disclosure. Hence it 
should give the issuer comfort that the competent authority will not, once the 
securities are admitted to trading or offered to the public, take action against it. 
Yet, the strength of this argument depends critically on the efficiency of the 
approval system. If authorities require lengthy approval times, the costs of the 
system are indeed likely to outweigh the benefits.62 Nevertheless if this point is 
borne in mind, it can be argued that the approval system, as envisaged under the 
PD, benefits issuers if considered as a risk reduction strategy. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article examined the nature and purpose of the prospectus approval system as 
envisaged under the PD. In section 2, it was argued that under the PD the ap-
proval system is best viewed as an ex ante enforcement system. Having identified 
the characteristics of such a system and having considered the prior approval in 
the light of these findings, the limits of the prospectus approval system, as 
envisaged under the Directive, were traced. In section 3, the purpose of the 
approval system was critically examined. The approval system was first situated 
in the broader context of a mandatory disclosure regime. In this context, the 
crucial question of the relation between the quality of disclosure and the prospec-
tus approval was raised. Taking as a premise that the prior approval must not only 
improve upon the quality of disclosure but that this improvement must matter for 
the recipients of the approved prospectus, the costs and benefits of the approval 
system were assessed. It was argued that the prior approval was unlikely to be of 
—————————————————— 
61  Cf., ibid., at pp. 704-705. 
62  The PD now provides for time limits. See n. 13 supra. 
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much benefit to professional investors. In relation to ordinary investors, it was 
argued that, while the prior approval could a priori be justified if considered from 
this perspective, such an argument was not without difficulties. The risk of 
overconfident investors was mentioned and difficulties associated with disclosure 
regulation as a regulatory strategy for the protection of ordinary investors were 
highlighted. Finally, the prior approval was examined from the perspective of the 
issuer. It was argued that the approval system should be considered as a risk 
reduction strategy for issuers. If considered as such, it was argued that the prior 
approval could benefit issuers, provided that the approval process was not unduly 
inefficient. 
